The emergence of the village and the transformation of traditional institutions: a case study from Northern Tanzania by McCabe, J. Terrence et al.
 
 
 
 
 
McCabe, J. T., Leslie, P. and Davis, A. (2020) The emergence of the village 
and the transformation of traditional institutions: a case study from 
Northern Tanzania. Human Organization, 79(2), pp. 150-160. (doi: 
10.17730/1938-3525.79.2.150). 
 
This is the author’s final accepted version. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/223284/    
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 23 September 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
 
  
TITLE: The Emergence of the Village and the Transformation of Traditional Institutions: 
A Case Study from Northern Tanzania 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we examine how the 2008/09 drought in northern Tanzania contributed to 
and catalyzed the transformation of governance concerning the management of natural resources 
from traditional informal institutions among the Maasai to formal village-based institutions.  Our 
central argument is that village governance in northern Tanzania represents a new, formal 
institution that is supplementing and in some important ways obviating traditional, informal 
institutions. Further, this replacement is central to what appears to be a transformation of the 
social-ecological system embracing the rangelands and pastoral/agro-pastoral people in northern 
Tanzania.  In this paper, we document the basis for our claims concerning the institutional shift 
and discuss its implications for livelihoods and social relationships.    
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 Introduction and Background 
In 2008/2009 the rangelands of northern Tanzania and southern Kenya experienced a 
severe drought in which both the long and short rains failed.  There was large-scale migration of 
people and cattle from the Tanzania/Kenya border southward in search of pasture and water, but 
despite this migration, border communities lost significant numbers of livestock.  Meanwhile, in 
the Simanjiro plains in northern Tanzania, the drought was less severe and there was enough 
grass and water for livestock in communities east of Tarangire National Park.  Tens of thousands 
of cattle were herded from the north toward and into Simanjiro villages.  The influx of livestock 
overwhelmed the capacity of the natural resource base to support both the newcomers and 
residents.  After the drought, a local leader in Simanjiro said: “What could we do – we could not 
refuse them, they were all Maasai, and when the grass was gone we had to migrate all together to 
where we could find pasture and water.”  That comment reflected longstanding attitudes and 
practices.  However, following the return of the migrants north to their home areas, many of the 
Simanjiro communities changed the rules governing access to local resources.  For the first time, 
there was a shift away from traditional institutions that allowed Maasai outsiders access to 
resources, to village-based rules that restricted access based on land-use plans and village by-
laws. 
Drought is a common occurrence in the semi-arid rangelands of Africa and this drought, 
while severe, was not of historic dimensions in terms of lack of precipitation.  Why, then, was 
this particular drought so transformative?  Our research indicates that the answer entails the shift 
from informal ethnically-based traditional institutions that managed resource use to formalized 
village-based institutions, a process that began in 1967 and that continues to evolve. 
Understanding this process of institutional transformation is the subject of this paper.  
Our central argument is that village governance in northern Tanzania represents a new, 
formal institution that is supplementing and in some important ways obviating traditional, 
informal institutions.  Further, this replacement is central to what appears to be a transformation 
of the social-ecological system (SES) embracing the rangelands and pastoral/agro-pastoral 
people in northern Tanzania.  In this paper, we document the basis for our claims concerning the 
institutional shift and discuss its implications for livelihoods and social relationships.    
Our argument revolves around three intersecting realms of inquiry that are prominent in 
the literature on African rangelands: pastoralism and livelihood diversification; drought and 
resilience; and common property and institutional change.  We begin with a brief review of 
recent understanding of these topics as they bear on the problem at hand. 
Pastoralism and livelihood diversification 
Rangelands cover more of the earth’s land surface than any other type of land (Reid et al. 
2014). In Africa, rangelands cover about 40% of the land mass (Mwangi and Ostrom, 2009), and 
are home to approximately 30 million people who practice pastoralism or agro-pastoralism as 
their primary livelihood (Homewood (2008).  Although East African pastoralists are often 
associated with what is referred to as “pure” pastoralism (an economy based exclusively on 
raising livestock), most pastoral peoples now have diversified economies.  The most salient 
forms of diversification in recent decades have been the adoption of agriculture (O’Malley 2000, 
Homewood 2008, McCabe, Leslie and DeLuca 2010) and temporary labor migration out of the 
pastoral sector (May and McCabe 2004, Lesorogol 2008, McCabe et al. 2014, Smith 2012). 
Alienation of rangelands due to parks and protected areas has helped drive the need for 
pastoralists to diversify (Homewood and Brockington 1999, McCabe 2003, Igoe 2003, Goldman 
2013). Also important is gradual impoverishment due to an increasing human population and 
fluctuating or declining livestock populations, along with the desire to be “modern” (McCabe, 
Leslie and DeLuca 2014). The consequences of livelihood diversification have included better 
nutrition for pastoral families (McCabe 2003, McCabe, Leslie and DeLuca 2010), but also land 
fragmentation and a decline in ecosystem services (Burnsilver et.al. 2008, Galvin 2009).  
The role of institutional changes in driving livelihood diversification among pastoralists 
has not received much attention; neither has how diversification has contributed to institutional 
change.  Exceptions to this include the work of Mwangi (2005) about the formation and 
dissolution of group ranches among Maasai in southern Kenya; of Ensminger (1996) on the shift 
from subsistence herding to commercial livestock keeping among Orma in eastern Kenya (1992), 
and of Lesorogol (2008) on the shift of property rights from common grazing to individual 
holdings among Samburu in central Kenya.  
Common property and institutional change 
There are a number of ways that institutions are conceptualized, but Yami et al. 
(2009:154) note that most definitions entail “structures, mechanisms and processes as well as 
rules and norms that govern human behavior.”  They go on to define informal institutions as 
“systems of rules and decision-making procedures which have evolved from endogenous 
sociocultural codes and give rise to social practices, assign roles to participants and guide 
interactions among common pool resources users”; and formal institutions as “the rules that 
guide access, control and management of common pool resources, and which are backed up and 
enforced by the state” (Yami et.al 2009: 154).  In this case we refer to the change from ethnic 
based norms to village-based policies, with the enforcement the responsibility of the village 
government. Both formal and informal institutions play important roles in common property 
regimes. 
Although institutional change in East African pastoral societies has been under-studied, 
there is a large literature on common property regimes, and animal husbandry figures 
prominently in this literature. The most influential work relating to how successful common 
property resources are managed, and why they fail, stems from Elinor Ostrom (1990, 2003, 
2009). Of particular importance to the case study presented here is the centrality of trust and 
reciprocity to successful management of a commons (Ostrom 1990, 2003).  
One of the major arguments in the property rights literature is that privatization increases 
efficiency. Mwangi (2005) points out that the efficiency argument is based on the notion that 
private property encourages production by individuals and a more efficient use of resources, and 
that institutions will always evolve towards greater efficiency. She also points out that this 
argument is incomplete -- a fuller understanding of property rights must include politics, State 
interventions, and the distributional consequences of private property.  Further, changes in 
property rights can be triggered by economic transitions, the relative scarcity of resources and 
new markets. For a more detailed discussion of this issue see Bromley (1989). For the case being 
discussed here it could be argued that providing a guaranteed access to grazing within village 
boundaries is the efficient management strategy, but Reid et al (2014) argue that restricted 
movement actually lowers livestock productivity, and the ability to access distant resources 
during times of stress is considered critical to the sustainability of many pastoral production 
systems and societies (McCabe 2004). For changes in property rights among Maasai women see 
Goldman et. al. 2016. 
Recently, Bollig and Lesorogol (2016) edited an exploration of the idea of a “new 
commons.” They point out that the new commons are based on the view that natural resources should be 
commodified to the benefit of rural resource users and that they require a negotiation between the older 
forms of commons management and new forms. This is similar to the notion of a hybrid form of 
governance and Cleaver’s use of “institutional bricolage” in which new institutions are based on adapting 
and incorporating existing institutions (Cleaver et al 2013). 
Drought and resilience 
Wilhite (2000) argues that drought is the most complex but least understood of all natural 
hazards.  Drought is often defined as a significant decrease in precipitation, but there is not 
universal agreement on a definition or on how to measure drought severity.  Droughts differ 
fundamentally from many other disasters in that droughts develop slowly and it is often hard to 
determine exactly when they begin and end. The effects may last for years after the drought is 
over.  Further, drought’s effects may be spread over a wide geographical area, some of which 
may not have been directly impacted by the drought itself.   
The diverse and pervasive effects of drought lead directly to its central role in 
understanding the dynamics of social-ecological systems in arid and semi-arid regions, and 
consequently in understanding the adaptive capacity or resilience of communities in those 
regions.  Resilience can be defined as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and still 
retain its basic structure and function” (Walker and Salt 2006), but in the context of social-
ecological systems resilience means more than simply the persistence of ecological relationships 
or of social structure; it includes how aspects of social and political systems respond and adapt to 
shocks, and also reflects the adaptive capacity to respond to the opportunities and constraints that 
are created or enhanced by perturbations such as drought (Leslie and McCabe 2013:115, see also 
Folke 2006).  Social-ecological systems are complex adaptive systems.  As such, they often do 
not change in linear or predictable ways and fundamental relationships among the elements and 
processes that are central to the system can shift rapidly. 
Defining the components of the social-ecological system of which our study communities 
are a part, and evaluating its resilience, is beyond the scope of this paper,  However, we feel that 
the institutional changes that we discuss have profound implications for the future resilience of 
East African pastoral systems and communities. Similar to the argument for increased efficiency, 
it could be argued that by securing local grazing for local communities could enhance resilience, 
but most researchers of pastoral peoples feel that in arid and semi-arid areas where rainfall is 
temporally and spatially variable, mobility is one of the key elements in resilience, and that 
fragmentation of the rangeland reduces the overall resilience of the social-ecological system 
(Galvin 2009, Robinson and Berkes 2010, Leslie and McCabe 2013, and Quandt 2018 (for agro-
pastoralists)). 
 
Setting and People 
The setting  
The study reported here is grounded in two areas in the rangelands of northern Tanzania -
– Longido and Simanjiro -- located to the west of Mount Kilimanjaro and east of Lake Natron 
(see Figure 1). This landscape is famous for its network of parks and protected areas and the 
large populations of charismatic wildlife. The establishment of multiple parks -- Tarangire, 
Manyara, Serengeti, Kilimanjaro, and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area -- alienated important 
resources from the Maasai people, and restricted movements into what they traditionally 
considered drought reserves. 
The Simanjiro plains are part of the Maasai Steppe or the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem. 
Vegetation consists of mixed woodlands and extensive grasslands. Rainfall averages between 
575 to 650 mm per year but is unpredictable both spatially and temporally.  The rangelands 
along the Kenya/Tanzania border area are drier than in Simanjiro, with rainfall averaging 
between 300 and 600 mm per year and the higher elevations receiving significantly more 
precipitation than the lowlands (Trench et al.2009). Due to the lack of rainfall, cultivation is less 
viable in Longido than in Simanjiro and people are even more dependent on livestock as their 
principle livelihood strategy.  In both areas, drought is frequent and at times severe. 
                                                           Figure 1. Map of study area. 
 
 
The people 
Traditional Maasai culture, social organization, and livelihoods have been well described 
(e.g., Homewood and Rodgers 1991, O’Malley 2000, Hodgson, 2011, Mwangi 2005,).  Here, we 
present a brief overview of those aspects of social organization that are especially relevant to the 
problem at hand. Maasai social organization is based on three interlinked institutions: territorial 
sections, age sets/grades, and marriage and family.  
The largest territorial unit is the section or olosho in Maa. The communities in this study 
were all members of the Kisongo section of the Maasai.  Within this territory grazing resources 
are available to all members of the section, but specific areas were set aside for dry season 
grazing while others were designated for wet season use.  Particular areas or “localities” (inkutot) 
are managed by a group of elder men who decide on where livestock should be grazed and where 
cultivation will be allowed.  
All Maasai men are members of a clan (olgilata), with the larger clans sub-divided into a 
number of smaller sub-clans. Each clan has a clan leader but most function on more 
circumscribed territorial areas, with local clan leaders. Important for the resilience of households, 
each clan functions as a mutual aid group. Livestock are redistributed to impoverished clan 
members following a crisis and clan members may collect funds to help other clan members 
facing particular challenges, such as hospital or school fees. In addition to acting as mutual aid 
groups, clans also manage many water rights.  Small streams, springs, and occasionally dams 
may be “owned” by clans and the rights concerning who could use them were the responsibility 
of the clan. 
All adult Maasai men are also members of a particular age set which forms part of the 
age grade system.  Together as members of an age set, men pass through a series of age grades 
from boys (although “boys” is not generally considered to be one of the age grades), to warriors, 
junior elders, senior elders and retired elders. During the time that young men are in the warrior 
(Ilmurran) age grade they are circumcised and a leader is chosen by members of  the elder age 
grade (often referred to as firestick elders). However, as Goldman points out in her forthcoming 
book there is a new category of traditional leaders that are affiliated with clans on a local level 
(Goldman forthcoming). This Ilaiguenani will serve as the age set leader throughout his life.  
Progression to the next age grade is triggered by the advancement of the warrior age grade to 
junior elder status, roughly every 10 to 14 years. Traditionally, age set leaders advised people on 
day to day affairs and looked out for their economic and social welfare.  Especially important 
here is the influence of age set leaders in defining wet and dry season grazing areas and when 
these would be opened and closed.  Further, members of an age set have rights and obligations to 
each other throughout the course of their lives. 
These three institutions -- the age grade/age set system, the relationships among family 
and clan members, and the territorial organization -- are pillars of traditional Maasai social 
organization, all with roles in defining rights and obligations and in managing access to 
resources.  As we will see, this traditional organization still functions but its importance has been 
eclipsed by formal village based institutions, at least with respect to land use and management. 
The above description of Maasai social organization is in no way meant to suggest that 
Maasai society is locked into a historical past. Maasai society is changing rapidly, as is clear 
from our discussions below of the adoption of cultivation, out-migration to urban areas and 
engagement with the tanzanite gem business, which we present in the case study. For a more 
detailed discussion of what Maasai men and women view as important to their well-being today 
see Woodhouse and McCabe 2018). 
Village governance 
Village government consists of a village assembly that includes all individuals over the 
age of 18. Members of the village assembly elect a chairperson (mwenyekiti), secretary (kitibu), 
and treasurer while the village executive officer (mtendaji) is appointed by the District. Each 
village is divided into sub-villages (kitongoji, pl. vitongoji), each of which also has a chairperson, 
and secretary. The village council is the governing body of the village and consists of the 
chairperson, all sub-village chairpersons, and elected members that must include women. Within 
the village council a series of smaller committees are formed to deal with such legislative matters 
as finance, social services, security, forest protection, water management and development, etc.  
In many villages where the principal livelihood activity is raising livestock, a livestock 
committee is responsible for defining areas of wet and dry season grazing and sometimes for 
determining when dry season grazing areas are opened to village members. Following the 
2008/2009 drought we witnessed some livestock committees, or newly formed committees, 
assigned the responsibility of evaluating the capacity of village resources to accommodate people 
and livestock that migrate onto village lands, and to suggest changes in village by-laws and land 
use plans based on the availability of pasture and water.  It should be noted that in many cases 
pastoral oriented NGOs helped with the land use plans adopted by the villages. 
The evolution of the village 
It might be expected that once villages were formed they would rapidly take over the role 
formerly played by traditional institutions, but that was not the case. For decades after the 
formation of the villages, the government’s intended purposes of the village – as well as the 
village boundaries -- were largely ignored.  
In 1967, Julius Nyerere delivered the now famous Arusha Declaration, in which he laid 
out his vision of a socialist agenda based on a system of rural villages with a central settlement 
area surrounded by farms and pastures. In these “Ujamaa” villages (Swahili word for family ties, 
which has come to mean socialist) (O’Malley 2000), there was little consideration of the existing 
land tenure systems, or of community rights based on custom or tradition (Shivji 1998). 
Nevertheless, this policy was implemented across more than 8,000 villages throughout Tanzania, 
a process often referred to as “villagization.” This process took place gradually across Tanzania 
between 1970 and 1974. According to Hyden (1980:104) “The number of ujamma villages rose 
from 1956 to 4484 between 1970 and 1971. The following year the figure exceeded 5500.”  For 
a more detailed discussion of the villagization process in Tanzania see Hyden, 1980 and 
Schneider 2014) 
It was not until 1974 that the ujamaa villages began to be established among Maasai 
communities in northern Tanzania. In Maasailand, this policy became known as “Operation 
Imparnati” based on the Maasai word for settlement or permanent dwelling (Ndagala, 1982). 
The reason for the delay in implementing the villagization process, according to Ndagala (1982) 
was that “The Maasai,..like other pastoralists were considered to be a problem by policy makers. 
Efforts were thus put on groups believed to be easier to deal with, the cultivators” (Ndagala, 
1982:28).  
The Maasai did not put up much resistance, as needed health dispensaries and primary 
schools were established. Also, according to O’Malley (2000), people were convinced that the 
basic idea of permanent settlement was incompatible with a pastoral livelihood and that after a 
while people would return to their former ways of managing resources and seasonal migrations. 
Although there were new “villages” with permanent buildings and the provision of some basic 
services, most Maasai did return to their traditional livelihoods. As late as 1991 Homewood and 
Rodgers, writing about Maasai living in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, stated: 
“Overall these villages have had little lasting impact on patterns of settlement and 
seasonal movement, nor do they correspond with traditional economic or leadership 
structures. Individual families still live in widely dispersed bomas. Seasonal movements 
crosscut village boundaries and different families using the same village in the dry season 
may move to different wet season pastures, each associated with quite different 
alternative villages. Alongside the imposed village structure, the traditional systems of 
section, clan, age-set and boma still govern NCA Maasai access to resources and form the 
basis of their risk avoidance strategies and of their efficient livestock management in an 
unpredictable environment.” (Homewood and Rodgers, 1991:56). 
Although people were moving with their livestock, and land and resources were being managed 
according to traditional institutions, important changes were occurring at both the household and 
village levels. We describe some of these changes below. The most critical changes include: 
adoption of cultivation, allocation of land to individuals, out migration of young men to find 
work as laborers or tanzanite gem traders, development of community managed resources, 
human population increase, and changes in government policies. These all interacted with one 
another and were the underlying conditions which precipitated the transformation of village 
governance following the 2008/09 drought. 
 
The Case Study – The Village and Drought Response in Northern Tanzania 
The land-use and livelihoods study 
We have been conducting research on land use and livelihoods in Simanjiro District since 
2004 and in Longido District since 2015, and have published on livelihood diversification – both 
the adoption of cultivation (McCabe et al. 2010) and temporary out-migration (McCabe et al. 
2014) -- the impact of conservation (Baird et al. 2009, Davis 2011), and how people perceive 
human well-being (Woodhouse and McCabe 2018), among other topics.  The information 
presented below   concerning attitudes and actions on the part of village leadership and herd 
owners during and following the 2008-09 drought are based on 85 group interviews conducted in 
2016: 59 among men (256 individuals); and 26 among women (129 individuals). These group 
interviews focused specifically on the responses to and consequences of the 2008/09 and 
2016/17 droughts. Although both men and women were interviewed many of the women referred 
us to their husbands concerning issues related to livestock which migrated. How women 
specifically coped during the droughts will be the subject of subsequent publications.  These 
interviews were supplemented by related information from an ongoing longitudinal livelihood 
survey we have been conducting in Simanjiro for nearly 15 years. The longitudinal research that 
we have been conducting concerned livelihood diversification, included cultivation and out-
migration, and challenges of being located close to a national park. The topic of drought often 
came up during this research.  
Cultivation 
Cultivation among the Maasai in most parts of northern Tanzania began in the early 
1980s, but there was significant variation across villages. For the most part, cultivation began 
with small gardens (less than one acre) and later expanded into farms (more than one acre). The 
preferred crops were maize and beans, although some people experimented with crops such as 
sunflowers or sesame. Most of the early adopters of cultivation learned by observing non-Maasai 
(WaArusha, WaMeru and Tanzanians of East Indian descent).  Unlike some other pastoral 
groups (e.g., Turkana) Maasai had traditionally incorporated grain into their diet, obtaining it 
through trade with local cultivators or by purchase following sale of livestock. Maasai were well 
known for their historical aversion to engaging in agriculture themselves. 
The motivations for cultivating have changed over time. Our research showed that by the 
first decade of the 21st century most Maasai families in Tanzania were cultivating.  Poor people 
did so out of need for food, while wealthier people were cultivating so that they did not have to 
sell livestock to obtain cash for grain or other purposes (McCabe et al. 2010). Cultivation in 
Simanjiro has been qualitatively different from other areas, with increasing numbers of large 
farms being plowed by tractors or ox plows. Yields are highly variable, but now cultivation is 
considered part of being a modern Tanzanian, and despite the concerns of conservationists1 is 
unlikely to decrease, except in those areas where yields are consistently poor. 
Land allocation 
Village land began to be allocated to individual household heads in the study areas as 
early as 1977 but especially in the 1980s and into the 1990s.  Unlike privatization in Kenya, 
when a parcel of land is allocated in Tanzania the central government retains rights to the land. 
Individuals are technically not allowed to sell land but have use rights for various periods of 
time.  
Following village formation in the late 1970s a few individuals, including influential 
Maasai, some non-Maasai Tanzanians, and a few expatriates, were given very large tracts of land 
(e.g., the Stein Lease encompassed 381,000 acres). During the 1980s more non-Maasai were 
attempting to obtain large allocations and this worried village leaders. According to recent 
interviews, the initial push to allocate land to households was not driven by household heads 
advocating for such allocation, but from village leaders who felt that if land was not allocated to 
residents then it would be lost to outsiders.  
As population increased, the desire for household allocations grew. Throughout our 14 
years of research in Simanjiro, population growth has frequently been mentioned as a principle 
driver of the need for household land allocation, especially as interest in cultivation increased2.  
An individual allocation of land has come to be seen as necessary for a family’s economic well-
being (Woodhouse and McCabe 2018). 
Insecurity of land tenure remains an important concern. Villages that border Tarangire 
National Park feel their land is at risk due to potential park expansion (Baird, Leslie and 
McCabe, 2009, Davis 2010, 2011). The splitting of Arusha Region into Arusha and Manyara 
Regions in 2002 also contributed to the sense of insecurity of land tenure. Simanjiro was part of 
Arusha Region until 2002 and included many pastoral communities. Manyara Region, on the 
other hand, is composed primarily of agricultural communities, many of which have limited land 
for cultivation. As a result, some sub-villages in Simanjiro have allocated all their land to 
demonstrate that there is no “open” land. 
Out migration 
Young men began leaving their homes to seek work in urban areas in the early to mid-
1990’s (McCabe et al. 2014). The principal form of employment was as guards at private homes 
and businesses. Maasai were able to benefit from their reputation as warriors but the work was 
dangerous and paid poorly.  The temporary migrants were hoping to earn enough money to start 
a herd of their own but few were able to accumulate enough money to purchase anything more 
than a few goats and an occasional cow.  However, some of these young men were successful 
enough to encourage other young men to seek work as guards. Over time the migration of young 
men away from Maasailand became an accepted norm, with many leaving home shortly after 
their circumcision and becoming warriors. 
This pattern of labor migration spread all over Maasailand, but in the mid-1980s young 
men from Simanjiro began going to the tanzanite mines in the town of Merirani, just south of 
Kilimanjaro airport, but still within Simanjiro District. What made this migration so unusual was 
that they were not going there to work in the mines but rather to act as middlemen in the gem 
trade. The process of migration was also very different from that described above. Migration to 
the tanzanite mines was usually a family decision with the father providing enough money for 
one or more sons to go and learn the gem business. Unlike working as guards, some of these 
migrants made quite of bit of money -- in some cases, enough to buy new 4-wheel drive vehicles 
and tractors, and to build a modern house. In addition, many of these men were able to secure 
very large land allocations. For more on Maasai engaged in the gem trade see Smith 2012.  
In addition to gaining material benefits, migrants experienced life outside of Maasailand 
and a livelihood not based on raising livestock. This experience, along with mixing with many 
non-Maasai, propelled many of these men to important positions in village leadership once they 
returned. As village leaders they were able to influence decisions relating to land use, 
emphasizing land allocations and large scale cultivation. In many ways this is similar to the 
events described by Lesorogol (2008) among the Samburu.  There, young men with experience 
outside of their Samburu villages were able to overturn the emphasis on age as being critical to 
political leadership, which resulted in policies favoring the privatization of commonly managed 
grazing lands. 
The acceptance of village governance and community managed resources 
Following the establishment of each village, the official Tanzanian governance structure 
was put in place, with a chairperson and Village Council elected from the village assembly, as 
described above.  However, very little changed as almost all the new chairpersons were the 
traditional leaders of the senior age sets, the olaigwanani. Wet and dry season pastures were 
regulated as before, with enforcement supported by the threat of a curse by village elders. 
According to one olaigwanani of the Makaa age set (1973- 1985)  and a sub-village chair,  
“Traditional leaders were adored until the late 1980s. They defined dry season grazing 
zones plus restricted where people could settle. A spell was cast by the traditional leaders to 
anyone who violated these rules. Once cast, the spell would result in the death of livestock by 
being eaten by wildlife or by being bitten by a snake; or the house of the violator would burn 
down. Once the violation was known all this would happen before sunset of the same day” 
(interview conducted in October, 2017). 
An important official change was the appointment of a village executive officer (VEO) 
by the District government. For most of the Simanjiro and Longido villages this occurred in the 
1980s and 1990s. Although the VEO works closely with the Village Council, he or she is the 
representative of the District government in the village and is often not of the same ethnic group 
as the village members. The appointment of VEOs marked a transition from local traditional 
leadership to more closely working within the larger governmental system.  The significance of 
traditional leaders in governance is not restricted to the Maasai or to Tanzania.. Carolyn Logan  
(2011) used Afrobarometer data for 19 African counties to examine the role of traditional leaders 
in a continent-wide context. 
Other factors as well were influential in formalizing the village as the principal governing 
body in Maasailand. Gardner (2016) argues that one significant factor was the desire of tour 
companies to secure rights among local communities to set up camps and to bring tourists into 
areas that were close to but not inside the national parks. Gardner provides the example of 
Dorobo Safaris in making arrangements with Maasai communities in the early 1990s, in which 
the company paid for exclusive right of access to village lands, and links this directly to the 
growing authority of the village as a key institution:  “This new spatiality of conservation in 
Loliondo rests on the articulation of the village as a rights bearing entity grounded in historical, 
culturally based traditional rights. Through this new understanding, the village has become a 
meaningful social and spatial unit of rights and belonging” (Gardner 2016: 131).  
Other aspects of village development were the construction of dams, clinics, schools and 
boreholes. Some of these were funded by religious organizations, NGOs and government 
agencies, but the management was under the control of village government.  
The village land acts 
In 1999 the Tanzanian government passed two acts that have been referred to as “the 
most important measures relating to land tenure in present Tanzania” (Roughton, 2007:552). The 
purpose of the acts (and the 2004 amendment to the Land Act), was to clarify the existing land 
laws, to develop land markets, to facilitate the equitable distribution of lands, and to allow 
women to own land (Mwangi 2009, Roughton 2007). The acts divide land into three categories: 
reserve land, which is set aside for purposes such as national parks and forest reserves; village 
land, which is land within the boundaries of a village; and general land which is all land not in 
the previous two categories but also includes unused village land. The Village Land Act 
devolves the authority to manage land within village boundaries to the Village Council, which 
may also appoint a land committee to facilitate decisions relating to land management. The 
Village Land Act has particular importance for women as it protects their rights to own3 land.  It 
also allows the Village Council to write and enact by-laws which are legally binding. This last 
provision is especially important in our case study.  
Although the Village Land Act stipulates that the Village Council is to act as the trustee 
for village lands, the land is still under the jurisdiction of the President of Tanzania. The Act also 
requires that the government issue a “certificate of village land” that recognizes the boundaries 
of each village (Roughton 2007).  Village land is classified as communal village land, land used 
by an individual or group, and land that the Village Council can allocate. Following 
implementation of the Village Land Act, the Village Councils, along with land committees and 
often with the assistance of a NGO, designed land use plans that would be submitted and 
approved by the District government. Although these land use plans were based on the 
traditionally defined wet and dry season grazing areas, their management was now under the 
control of the village government. Sub-village boundaries were also established and included in 
the land use plans. 
In some villages the wet and dry season grazing areas were marked by cement beacons, 
but what is crucial here is that land designations were now enforced by the village government 
through imposition of fines rather than by traditional leaders cursing any violators, a past norm. 
When asked about this transition we were repeatedly told that the power of traditional leaders to 
curse had significantly diminished. The reasons given for the erosion of powers of traditional 
leaders were the influence of the church, education, and “becoming modern”.  
Drought 
Droughts have been the principal environmental challenge facing the Maasai, and most 
climate change models predict that the severity and frequency of drought will increase in eastern 
Africa.  The study area has seen three significant droughts in the last decade: 2008/09, 2011, and 
2017.  According to Msoffe et al. (2011) extreme droughts occurred in the Tarangire/Simanjiro 
ecosystem in 1961, 1965, 1974, 1976 and 1991, and severe droughts in 1967, 1975, 1982, 1992, 
1993, 1997 and 2003 (their study period ended before the 2008/2009 drought). 
For most pastoral people, the primary means of coping with drought is through mobility, 
and for the Maasai this has meant migrating within and outside of national and sectional 
boundaries. Access to resources was negotiated based on traditional institutions, which often 
involved clan affiliation, or just the accepted norm that all Maasai should help each other in 
times of stress. It is also understood that what happens in one area today could happen to another 
area tomorrow. Despite differences, and at times hostility, among sections of the Maasai, there 
was always a sense of trust that livestock would be able to cross spatial boundaries and that 
refusal to accommodate migrating livestock and their herders was unacceptable. This sense of 
trust among Maasai did not change as the villages designed and implemented their own land use 
plans, although the potential for change was recognized by some. As Mwangi stated in 2005: 
“Reduced mobility will likely magnify vulnerability to drought and may jeopardize the ability of 
the livestock enterprise upon which pastoral livelihoods are dependent. In the longer run, it may 
also undermine the reproduction of the pastoral culture. No doubt the Maasai are aware of this” 
(Mwangi 2005: 2).  
Many areas that were former drought reserves have now been alienated from the Maasai 
by the boundaries of national parks and protected areas, and in places by the presence of large 
commercial farms. Sometimes herders will drive livestock across national park boundaries at 
night, or attempt to bribe rangers, but the risks can be substantial. This makes the ability to cross 
national, sectional and village boundaries all the more important.  
This brings us back to the 2008/09 drought. As described in the opening vignette of this 
paper, many thousands (perhaps hundreds of thousands) of cattle, along with their herders, left 
the pastoral communities in southern Kenya and along the Kenya/Tanzania border area in a 
southward migration seeking better pasture and water. In all but one area these migrants were 
accommodated, if not outwardly welcomed.  However, along the eastern escarpment of the Rift 
Valley, east of the Ngorongoro highlands in an area referred to as “Manyara” we were told in the 
group interviews that some local residents not only refused access to grazing for the migrating 
livestock, but berated the herders and in some cases attacked people at night. Some were beaten 
so badly that they had to be transported to hospitals in Arusha, many hours away by vehicle4. 
Discussions about this with Maasai who took part in that migration indicated that such violence 
and lack of accommodation had never happened before, and that in the event that the people 
from “Manyara” experienced similar drought conditions and needed to migrate north, they would 
be refused. This incident was deemed so important that this drought is referred to as the 
“Manyara drought” even though it was spatially much more extensive.  It represents a significant 
break in the management of the social-ecological system of the northern Tanzanian rangelands. 
For the first time traditional institutions did not facilitate access to resources, and village 
boundaries were defended. 
In Simanjiro, migrants were welcomed, and although the migrants suffered significant 
livestock loss, they felt that the trust that unites all Maasai in times of stress was maintained. 
However, many people in the Simanjiro communities that received the migrants felt that times 
had changed. Village based resources were overwhelmed and local resources depleted. Some 
maintain that even today, nearly a decade later, grazing resources have not recovered from the 
intensive use they experienced during this drought. After the migrants had returned north, land 
committees in three of the four Simanjiro villages in our study were charged with coming up 
with solutions to these problems in case of future droughts. The solutions were not uniform; they 
varied from defining a specific area for migrants to temporarily live and graze livestock, to 
setting limitations on the numbers of herds or livestock that could come in; to setting fees for 
grazing and water for each head of livestock; to specifying dates when parts of the village 
grazing zones could be opened to migrants and when they had to leave.  
Such proposed measures were considered by the village councils and voted on by the 
village assemblies. They were then formalized and written into to the village by-laws. The 
formal codification by incorporation into the by-laws was most commonly explained by 
statements such as “We had to do it that way – otherwise it would be impossible to refuse friends 
or relatives but we know we have to protect our village resources.”  We heard this repeatedly, 
which strongly suggests that under current conditions informal institutions that allowed access to 
resources by outsiders were, at least in Simanjiro, coming to be seen as unable to cope with the 
influx of outsiders.  In discussing these changes with people in Longido (where the Tanzanian 
migrants came from) they said – “No that is impossible – when the next drought comes we will 
go back – they [the people in Simanjiro] cannot refuse us – we are all Maasai.” This is indicative 
of the evolving institutional dynamics among the Maasai in northern Tanzania.  If people in 
Simanjiro refuse access to in-migrants, then we would expect that people in Longido would 
reciprocate in the same was as they say they will with people from Manyara. 
Recent events- another drought, another test 
In December 2017, due to yet another drought, herders from Kenya again began to move 
their cattle into the northern Tanzania rangelands. In the past, the Tanzanian government had 
occasionally intercepted such livestock and sent them back to Kenya. However, this time the 
cattle were confiscated and sold, and the herders returned to Kenya. This represented not a new 
policy but rather the strict enforcement of a policy that had only occasionally been enforced. 
Similar incidents were reported along the Kenya/Tanzania border near Loliondo, to the west of 
our study area.  In interviews conducted in February 2018, one of us (JTM) was told that many 
cattle belonging to Kenyan Maasai were dying, but that the Kenyan Maasai were afraid to cross 
the border into Tanzania. This signifies an important policy shift that in essence cuts the Maasai 
social-ecological system in two. If this policy is maintained there will be social, ecological and 
economic implications for livestock keepers on both sides of the border5. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The Longido/Simanjiro case study presented here is unique in relation to the literature on 
common property and institutional change in East Africa. Some of the motivations for 
privatization are similar to those described by Lesorogol (2008) for the Samburu and for the 
formation of group ranches and their division described by Mwangi (2005), but in both those 
instances the discussions focused on the conversion of communal land to individual holdings.  
The threat of loss of land to outsiders was considered important for Maasai initially agreeing to 
the formation of group ranches in Kenya, and this has relevance to the Tanzania case.  However, 
with the exception of Gardner (2016), few if any publications explore the process of change in 
the management of natural resources in East Africa that we document here – the shift from 
control grounded in traditional informal institutions to formal village-based institutions. 
The wider literature on common property emphasizes the complexity of understanding 
how common property resources are managed and change, and we certainly see complexity in 
our Tanzanian case. We also see how governmental policy interacts with local traditions and 
management practices to form a somewhat hybrid form of governance. The new rules and the 
uncertainty associated with what will happen in the future reflects Cleaver’s “institutional 
bricolage” (Cleaver et al. 2013).  It also articulates well with the concept of the “new commons” 
(Bollig and Lesorogol 2016), entailing negotiation between older and newer forms of commons 
management.  Typically (but not invariably), the former are informal, the latter formal.   
It is also clear that the case study does not describe a completed transformation of 
common property management, nor of the larger social-ecological system.  Rather, it describes 
an evolving process of transformation.  The ongoing process and ongoing negotiation is seen in 
both past and more recent developments, which reflect not a linear shift in authority but rather 
iterated feedback wherein traditional and newer institutions mutually inform and influence one 
another and the resulting hybrid.  For example, a decade ago traditional use of wet and dry 
season grazing areas, enforced by traditional leaders, provided the basis for the village-based 
land designations later enforced by the village government.  Now, although the authority to 
manage resources is under the control of village governments, people have begun discussing the 
problems of having land management decisions made by politicians rather than traditional 
leaders.  Another example is seen in current discussions among villages about combining 
rangelands, which might well entail management based on elements of traditional social 
organization (e.g., traditional leaders, age sets) that bridge the new formal village-based 
institutions.   
It is clear that the two major policy shifts, Operation Imparnati in the 1970s and the 
Village Land Act of 1999, did not result in institutional change until long after the policies were 
implemented.  It was the combination of multiple interacting factors that culminated in 
institutional change precipitated by an extreme event, in this case the 2008/09 drought. 
Especially important to the Longido/Simanjiro case are the perceptions of population increase, 
increasingly scarce and limited resources, an inability to control boundaries, and the erosion of 
traditional means of enforcement of management rules.  
We may be witnessing the demise of a successful, long-term resilient social-ecological 
system encompassing the rangelands, the livestock, and the livelihoods of Maasai people in both 
Tanzania and Kenya. Ostrom pointed out the importance of trust and reciprocity for the 
successful management of a common property system. Trust has been challenged by the 
confiscation and sale of Kenyan livestock by the Tanzanian government. Reciprocity has been 
compromised by the refusal of people in “Manyara” to allow livestock to graze on village lands, 
and their beating of the migrant herders violated both trust and reciprocity.  
We do not know how the villages in northern Tanzania will respond to the next drought – 
which communities will be on the sending and receiving sides of any migration, and what the 
expectations, rules followed, and reactions will be.  But it is well understood that limiting 
mobility will reduce the adaptive capacity for people to respond to drought stress, will further 
fragment the rangelands and will pose a significant challenge to what has been a resilient SES.  
Just what the nature of the now transforming social-ecological system turns out to be – the 
specific elements of the system (mixture of new and traditional institutions, livelihood strategies, 
engagement with regional and global influences, etc.) and relationships among those elements – 
remains to be seen.  The resilience of the transformed system to longstanding challenges such as 
drought along with newer environmental, social/economic/political perturbations, and the 
implications of all of this for the wellbeing of those in these communities, is similarly murky. 
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Figure 1: Map of Northern Tanzania 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1 The Simanjiro plains are the wet season dispersal area for much of the wildlife living inside 
Tarangire National Park and this wet season migration is considered critical to the viability of the 
Park 
 
2 Data collected at the village level confirms the perception of population increase 
 
3 As mentioned previously, Tanzanian citizens do not technically “own” land, but the 
government is granting titles in a few experimental areas 
 
4 In interviews conducted among some Manyara residences by Davis in 2017 no one admitted to 
taking part in these incidents.  
 
5. There have been some very recent reports of people and livestock crossing the border for 
villagers living along the Kenya/Tanzania boundary. 
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